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COMMENTS
REVIEW OF FINDINGS BY THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE
UNITED STATES
What foundation should be laid for review of findings by a Federal
Court in an action at law? This is often a troublesome question for
the trial lawyer and the purpose of this article is to consider the case of
Muentzer et al, v. Los Angeles Trutst and Savings Bazk 3F (2nd) 222,
in our Circuit. This case holds that a review of findings can be had
without any motion for finding in favor of the losing party having
been made at the trial. The decision, however, is really dictum as the
case was affirmed, and the following matters should be taken into con-
sideration in determining how far the decision can be relied upon.
Until 1865 when a case was tried before the court without a jury the
judge was in effect an arbitrator and no question could be raised as to
his findings. Then Congress enacted what we now know as Sections
649 and 700 R. S. (Sees. 1587 and 1668 Comp. St. 1916). Congress
here provided that the parties might stipulate for trial by the court in
the Circuit Court and when they did so" the rulings of the court in the
progress of the trial of the cause, if excepted to at the time" might
be reviewed. During the existence of both the Circuit and District
Courts even under this statute decisions by the District Court were not
reviewable, because the statute made provision only as to Circuit
Courts. Since the abolition of the Circuit Court and the transfer of
its function to the District Court it is believed that Sections 649 and
700 R. S. now have application to the District Courts and a review
may be had of findings in the District Court on a ruling of the court
"in the progress of the trial of the cause, if excepted to at the time."
Appellate procedure being of statutory origin must be in accordance
with the statute and a review cannot be had except by compliance
with the statute.1 This was not only well settled in the Supreme Court
but in the various Circuit Courts of Appeal, including the Seventh
Circuit.2
The decision in Mu1tentzer v. Bank, supra, is based largely on an
amendment to Sec. 269 of the Judicial Code3 which provides in cases
of review the "court shall give judgment after an examination of the
1 Afartinton v. Fairbanks, 112 U. S. 670; 5 S. Ct. 321. Stanley v. Board,
121 U. S. 535; 7 S. Ct. 1234. Wilsom v. Merchants, etc., Co., 183 U. S.
121; 22 S. Ct. 54. Boardman . Toffey, 117 U. S. 271; 6 S. Ct. 734. Gar-
wood v. Scheiber, 246 Fed. 74; C. C. A. 9 C. National Surety Co. v. Am
etc., Ry. Co., 145 Fed. 34 C. C. A. 6 C. White v. Chase, 201 Fed. 896 C. C.
A. 8 C. Phoenix Securities Co. v. Dittmar, 224 Fed. 892 C. C. A. 9 C. Sierra
Land Co. v.'Desert Power Co., 229 Fed. 982 C. C. A. 9 C.
2 Streeter v. Chicago, etc., 133 Fed. 124 C. C. A. 7 C. Raymer v. Nether-
wood, 257 Fed. 284 C. C. A. 7 C. (Expressly overruled in Muentzer v. Bank,
supra.)
3 Act. Feb. 26, 1919 Comp. St. Am. Supp. 1919 Sec. 1246.
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entire record before the court, without regard to technical errors,
defects, or exceptions which do not affect the substantial rights of
the parties."
This provision our Circuit Court of Appeals in effect holds in the
Muentzer case is a repeal of See. 700 R. S. supra and authorizes the
court to review questions to which no exception was taken at the trial.
The amendment to See. 269 of the Judicial Code was apparently not
debated; and it seems the only expression of the purpose of Congress
shows that the purpose of the amendment was "judgment shall be
rendered upon the merits without permitting reversals for technical
defects in the procedure below and without presuming that any error
which may appear had been of necessity prejudicial to the complain-
ing party."' Thus it will be seen the purpose of Congress as ex-
pressed in this report was to facilitate affirmance of judgments.
Such has been the purpose of similar statutes in our States; and, it
it submitted, the language used in the amendment indicates that pur-
pose. The decision in the Muentzer v. Bank case construes the act to
facilitate reversals by permitting review of a question not reserved
below as required by See. 700 R. S.
Over a year after the amendment to See. 269 Judicial Code the Su-
preme Court said, in a case before it, that as there had been no excep-
tion taken during the trial a general finding was conclusive upon all
matters of fact and the review was limited to the sufficiency of the
complaint.5
On January 5, 1925 the Supreme Court reversed a decision of the
Circuit Court of Appeals, wherein the Circuit Court of Appeals had
reversed a District Court in a suit against the United States on a sol-
dier's insurance policy.6 The ground of the decision was that, as the
trial.in the District Court was before the Judge, the Circuit Court of
Appeals erred in reversing the District Court on account of failure of
proof. While certain technical distinctions may be made between these
two Supreme Court cases and the Muentzer case, yet they do manifest
that the Supreme Court is not conscious that the amendment to See.
269 in anywise affects the prior law relative to review of the proof in a
trial before the Court.
A number of recent cases in the various Circuit Courts of Appeal
have held that the amendment to See. 269 does not do away with the
exception at the trial required by See. 700 R. S.7 Muentzer v. Bank,
supra, was expressly noticed in a case in the 8th Circuit, in which ex-
4 House Report No. 913, 65th Congress, 3rd Session.
5-Vicksburg Co. v. Anderson Co., 256 U. S. 408, 415; 41 S. Ct. 524, 527.
6 Law v. United States, 266 U. S. 494; 45 S. Ct. 175.
7 Westfall v. United States 2F (2nd) 973; C. C. A. 6 C. Feinberg v.
United States, 2F (2nd) 955, 956; C. C. A. 8 C. Deupree v. United States,
2F (2nd) 44, 45; C. C. A. 9 C. Edwards v. United- States, 7F (2nd) 357;
C. C. A. 8 C.
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Senator Kenyon sat as Judge. s At the time of the decision in Muenf-
zer v. Bank, supra, there were some courts inclined to the view that the
amendment to See. 269 did do away with the necessity of an exception
in order to preserve the right of review and possibly Muentzer v. Bank,
supra, may represent a reform in procedure; but it is submitted that in
the case of trials before the court the procedure and right of review are
entirely statutory and no court can set aside the requirements of Con-
gress in this regard.
In order therefore to preserve the right of review of the proof in an
action at law tried by the Court the following steps should be carefully
taken:
First. Execute a written stipulation between the parties expressly
waiving a jury and agreeing to the trial before the Court and file the
same before beginning the trial.
Second. At the conclusion of the evidence during the trial and
before the finding, make an appropriate motion for finding in your
favor and during the trial save an exception to the overruling thereof.
Then of course the question saved is not whether the trial court
should have found as it did but whether there was any evidence to
support the finding as the finding has the same effect as a verdict of the
jury.
Special findings are not a matter of right in the Federal Court;
but, if they are made, there can be under Sec. 700 R. S. the additional
question, "Are the facts specially found sufficient to support the
judgment?"
MILTON W. 1HANGUS.
Of the Indianapolis Bar.
8 Allen v. Cartan Company 7F (2nd) 21 C. C. A. 8 C.
